Buy Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Revised edition by Gilles Kepel (ISBN: ) from Amazon’s Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery. “Gilles Kepel’s landmark book provides an in-depth history and compelling Perhaps the most definitive is Gilles Kepel’s Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam. Gilles Kepel Fluent in Arabic, Gilles Kepel has traveled throughout the Muslim world gathering documents, interviews, and.
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So what went wrong? Girls were off limits, as far as one could tell, and there was no sense in those days — before the commercial success of rai music — of any respectable Western-style alternative, such as conspicuous drunkenness, vandalism or the soft-porn industry.
Keepl the end of the s, the failure to seize political power elsewhere led to a split: When the earthquake struck in Tipasa, the FIS had only been in existence for about six months. The dedication and dispatch of the Brothers in the wake of the Cairo earthquake won them an impressive haul of donations the Mubarak Administration duly froze the bank accounts.
By the time some of these knights errant began to link up with the Islamist remnants — in Algeria, for instance — the potential for a mass movement in any of the countries concerned had ceased to exist. Again, the Army did the business.
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In short, Kepel is not only a leading scholar but also a man of the world… [ Jihad ] is probably the best introduction to Islamism currently available. InHasan al-Turabi, the driving force of Islamist rule in Sudan, was cast into the wilderness. Our politcial titles are available via Edelweiss. Sign In or Create an Account.
His nonsense books, mo …. There would eventually be demonstrations by radicalised Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. It allowed the Kingdom to identify itself both morally and financially with the Afghan resistance and thus to counter the threat posed by the Ayatollah.
This is dark terrain, encrusted with violence, but Kepel deals with it coldly and carefully. If Islamism is really finished, for example, what will it be that finally rocks the House of Saud to its foundations? The path of violent confrontation which Algerian Islamists were about to take was not new, but so far it had been confined to the isllam. We have never been sufficiently aware that the primary architects of the Islamic revolt against the West have regarded their struggle as a tool for gaining power over tril Muslims.
It was also to do with a sense of the traitor in the midst of the faithful: The Army was lustily engaged in pursuit of both groups and a three-cornered conflict ensued, with ordinary citizens in the middle. When the war in Afghanistan ended, however, the zealotry that was so dear to the Wahhabites and their princes once again rebounded on them, as the Arab veterans of the Afghan campaign milled about in Peshawar with nothing to do, and the CIA decided to turn off the tap.
With the war of October and the oil embargo, however, the balance of power shifted naturally in favour of Riyadh.
Yet one of the lessons of this book is that wealthy, conservative Islamism of the kind that puts its oil revenues about, along with its theology, can do as much as a Shah or an entrenched party of independence to inspire its radical counterpart. To purchase short term access, please sign in to your Oxford Academic account above.
That was the task of militant Islam, and there were plenty of militant Islamists in place, many of them teachers and students who were already active, preaching and ministering in working-class — and hittiste — neighbourhoods.
Jeremy Harding reviews ‘Jihad’ by Gilles Kepel, translated by Anthony F. Roberts · LRB 25 July
politiccal In the event, these were diverted. In this history of fundamentalist Islam, Kepel stands conventional wisdom on its head, asserting that teh spate of Islamist violence during the last few years is a result not of the movement’s success, but of its failure. He lives in France.
To compound its problems, the FIS leadership could not quite envisage a clean break with the regime — the only option for Iranians in the last days of the Shah — even though their followers were busy lambasting the FLN.
Kepel prefers to take the broad schematic view, whence his constant reference, country by country, to the young urban poor and the disenchanted middle class, the wary partners who must dance at the same fire if government according to the will of God is to come about. Discover what to read next. He is also the best-known commentator on Islamic affairs on French television, and he has advised international leaders at the Davos conferences. And to take as many enemies with them — spectral enemies included — as they could.
The late twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of jlhad unexpected and extraordinary phenomenon: Originally a gllles of highly contentious zealots, led politjcal a former anti-colonial hero and driven underground by FLN harassment, it had coalesced in as the Armed Islamic Movement.
The FIS introduced separate bathing in the resorts it controlled and put pressure on video kiosks and alcohol traders to close down. There was no import substitution to speak of. The Kingdom had launched a number of counter-offensives during the s, including the creation of the Muslim World Trwil, which proselytised and cozened and doled out funds, thereby ensuring that the Saudi case against progressive nationalism had an airing.
Then there are the gifted, energetic individuals, mini-Islamic states in themselves, in whom intolerance and human rights seem to reach a perfect accommodation. What he means is that the bid to seize power by force and govern by the laws of God had failed everywhere except in Iran, and that it jihaf not succeed anywhere in the foreseeable future: Most recently, the Taliban, a kind of non-government installed by Pakistan, poliyical be bombed out of business in Afghanistan.
The FIS had also fallen into the trap of attacking two targets simultaneously: In Iran, the secularised bourgeoisie had backed Khomeini because he professed openness and the inclusion of every element of society in his revolutionary project. Kepel tells us that the veterans in Peshawar were careful to distinguish a correct kind of salafism — theirs — from an incorrect kind: At the same time, he is extremely helpful on the big shifts in thinking across the Muslim world, the crushing disappointments and the relentless jockeying for supremacy that encouraged the rise of the holy warriors.
Sign In Forgot password? Ali Benhadj, the more charismatic of the two FIS leaders — a young firebrand who travelled by moped from one enthralled congregation of hittistes to the next — called for the formation of Algerian volunteer brigades to fight alongside the Iraqis. So if the story really was about to end inhow is it that the fury of the Arab veterans in Afghanistan — a fury brought on by the CIA funding cut-off and the Gulf War — became a megalomaniac elation? Despite the existence of a moderately prosperous middle class, it was the political elite, senior bureaucrats and the various managerial strata of state enterprises who tended to benefit most from this situation.
High birth rates in the latter part of the century; unmanageable levels of movement off the land; a post-Independence nationalist model that has failed more or less badly; a dispossessed urban poor with high expectations nourished by education: Both types, unfortunately, tend to have a grand plan: It arrived on site with its own teams of rescue workers, nurses and doctors, in ambulances carrying the party insignia.
Kepel grounds his argument in a sophisticated analysis of inter-Muslim relations. He had seen off the Americans and now he was inciting Muslims everywhere to rise up against their impious leaders.
Altogether, the book is so persuasive, so impeccably handled, that one longs to raise the occasional query.
The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, too, were widely praised.